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Ozyegin University

Academic institutioneurope · tr
Official website
Research library22linked papers
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Selected work

Representative Papers

Engineering Sustainable Agents: A Systematic Comparison of Agentic LLMs for Developer Workflows

Oct 02, 2026

This study addresses the high energy consumption of agentic large language models (LLMs) in software engineering by systematically quantifying the performance trade-offs between multi-agent architectures and single-agent baselines. Through a large-scale empirical evaluation involving six open-source LLMs, two prompting strategies, and three hardware platforms, we compare accuracy, latency, and energy consumption across five task categories. Results indicate that multi-agent systems consume 6.36 times more energy on average than baselines while yielding only marginal accuracy improvements. Furthermore, 59 of the 66 optimal configurations are non-agentic or single-agent, with lightweight architectures dominating the Pareto frontier. This work reveals the energy bottlenecks inherent in multi-agent designs and proposes task-aware guidelines for sustainable architecture selection.

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Pair rationality and top trading cycles on single-peaked and single-dipped domains

Sep 30, 2026

This paper investigates the axiomatic characterization of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism under single-peaked and single-dipped preference domains. Employing matching theory and axiomatic methods, we systematically analyze the applicability boundaries of Ekici and Yenmez’s characterization of TTC within restricted preference domains. Our findings reveal that this characterization fails in the single-peaked domain, whereas it holds in the single-dipped domain without requiring strategy-proofness. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the weakened conditions are not viable substitutes. This study clarifies the fundamental differences in the axiomatic foundations of TTC across distinct preference structures and refines the applicable scope of related theories, thereby providing a more precise theoretical basis for matching mechanism design under restricted preference domains.

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Recent publications

Latest Papers

Engineering Sustainable Agents: A Systematic Comparison of Agentic LLMs for Developer Workflows

Oct 02, 2026

This study addresses the high energy consumption of agentic large language models (LLMs) in software engineering by systematically quantifying the performance trade-offs between multi-agent architectures and single-agent baselines. Through a large-scale empirical evaluation involving six open-source LLMs, two prompting strategies, and three hardware platforms, we compare accuracy, latency, and energy consumption across five task categories. Results indicate that multi-agent systems consume 6.36 times more energy on average than baselines while yielding only marginal accuracy improvements. Furthermore, 59 of the 66 optimal configurations are non-agentic or single-agent, with lightweight architectures dominating the Pareto frontier. This work reveals the energy bottlenecks inherent in multi-agent designs and proposes task-aware guidelines for sustainable architecture selection.

0 citationsRead paper

Pair rationality and top trading cycles on single-peaked and single-dipped domains

Sep 30, 2026

This paper investigates the axiomatic characterization of the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism under single-peaked and single-dipped preference domains. Employing matching theory and axiomatic methods, we systematically analyze the applicability boundaries of Ekici and Yenmez’s characterization of TTC within restricted preference domains. Our findings reveal that this characterization fails in the single-peaked domain, whereas it holds in the single-dipped domain without requiring strategy-proofness. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the weakened conditions are not viable substitutes. This study clarifies the fundamental differences in the axiomatic foundations of TTC across distinct preference structures and refines the applicable scope of related theories, thereby providing a more precise theoretical basis for matching mechanism design under restricted preference domains.

0 citationsRead paper