Priority Coordination Games: Hodge Decomposition and a Sharp Design Limit
This study addresses the limitation that potential game approximations in decentralized priority coordination neglect non-conservative incentive components. By leveraging Hodge decomposition to analyze coordination games, this work quantifies the harmonic components unaccounted for by potential functions and evaluates their impact on steady-state probability currents and entropy production rates, integrating graph-theoretic conflict modeling with log-linear learning dynamics. The primary contribution is the first derivation of a closed-form solution for harmonic energy under linear payoffs. Furthermore, it establishes an error lower bound of 1/(d_max+1) for optimal common-objective models—yielding exactly 1/5 for an eight-vehicle intersection—and proves that the approximation error for non-constant rank payoffs in complete graphs is at least 1/N. These findings demonstrate that such deviations are fundamentally irreducible within mechanism design.