Selected work

Representative Papers

One Node, Two Roles: Simultaneous Contests for Validation and Attention in Rollups

Oct 08, 2026

This study addresses the insufficient execution diversity in optimistic rollups caused by verification and attention mechanisms, proposing a novel analytical framework that models both as coupled contests. Methodologically, it introduces the Tullock contest model alongside succinct cryptographic proofs, defines an unamortizability primitive for registered provers, and provides the first quantification of game-theoretic equilibrium bounds for execution diversity. The analysis demonstrates that the TRACE mechanism outperforms Proof of Diligence (PoD) and can effectively enhance diversity through cost modulation. These theoretical findings are further substantiated by empirical validation on the Arbitrum One network.

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The Economic Security of Exponential EIP-1559

Oct 07, 2026

This study addresses the lack of economic security guarantees in EIP-1559 fee mechanism parameter selection and its susceptibility to excessive blockchain state growth. For the first time, this work formally defines and implements the economic security of this mechanism. Methodologically, it establishes theoretical lower bounds for parameter configuration by constructing minimum-revenue distributions, and integrates game-theoretic and optimization analyses to derive optimal parameter strategies across diverse on-chain mechanisms. The research provides provably secure parameter configurations for Ethereum and variants such as Arbitrum, ensuring minimum fee revenue under high network loads to deter abuse. Ultimately, this approach effectively balances system efficiency with long-term security.

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Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base

Oct 02, 2026

This study investigates the causal impact of shortened auction cycles via Flashblocks on the Base chain upon arbitrageurs’ bidding strategies and competitive dynamics. Methodologically, we construct a difference-in-differences model using purely on-chain address-day panel data. By integrating first-price auction theory with activity-matched control groups, this work provides the first identification of the causal effect of auction cadence on priority fees, revealing that such fees comprise a fixed reserve price and a linear competition premium. Empirical results demonstrate that following the mechanism change, effective priority fees decreased significantly by 59%, accompanied by a substantial reduction in the fee share captured by early blocks. Overall, this research offers critical empirical evidence for optimizing Rollup governance parameters.

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Price Elasticity of Gas Demand on L1 and L2: Evidence from Ethereum and Arbitrum

Jun 11, 2026

This study provides the first empirical identification of the price elasticity of gas demand on Ethereum Mainnet (Layer 1) and Arbitrum One (Layer 2), offering micro-level insights for transaction fee mechanism design and resource pricing. Leveraging on-chain data from 2025–2026, the analysis employs a two-way fixed-effects panel regression combined with an instrumental variables approach to address endogeneity, alongside behavioral clustering and resource-type decomposition. The results reveal an overall elasticity of −0.006 on Layer 1 and −0.036 on Layer 2, with refundable resources on Layer 2 exhibiting a notably higher elasticity of −0.27. Moreover, highly active user clusters demonstrate elasticities up to six times the overall average, underscoring substantial heterogeneity across both resource types and user segments.

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Just-in-Time Resale in an Ahead-of-Time Auction: An Event Study

Mar 20, 2026

This study investigates how the emergence of the instant secondary market Kairos undermines the competitiveness and value capture of Arbitrum’s Timeboost primary auction mechanism. Employing an event study methodology, the analysis integrates bidding behavior, profit attribution, and market dynamics to compare primary and secondary market activity before and after Kairos’ deployment. The research reveals— for the first time—that the instant resale mechanism effectively neutralizes the primary auction’s intended function: the share of total payments captured by the primary auction plummeted from 62.7% to 14.8%, with substantial economic surplus diverted to the secondary market. Building on these findings, the paper proposes novel auction design improvements aimed at recapturing lost value, offering both empirical evidence and theoretical foundations for optimizing on-chain resource allocation mechanisms.

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Recent publications

Latest Papers

One Node, Two Roles: Simultaneous Contests for Validation and Attention in Rollups

Oct 08, 2026

This study addresses the insufficient execution diversity in optimistic rollups caused by verification and attention mechanisms, proposing a novel analytical framework that models both as coupled contests. Methodologically, it introduces the Tullock contest model alongside succinct cryptographic proofs, defines an unamortizability primitive for registered provers, and provides the first quantification of game-theoretic equilibrium bounds for execution diversity. The analysis demonstrates that the TRACE mechanism outperforms Proof of Diligence (PoD) and can effectively enhance diversity through cost modulation. These theoretical findings are further substantiated by empirical validation on the Arbitrum One network.

0 citationsRead paper

The Economic Security of Exponential EIP-1559

Oct 07, 2026

This study addresses the lack of economic security guarantees in EIP-1559 fee mechanism parameter selection and its susceptibility to excessive blockchain state growth. For the first time, this work formally defines and implements the economic security of this mechanism. Methodologically, it establishes theoretical lower bounds for parameter configuration by constructing minimum-revenue distributions, and integrates game-theoretic and optimization analyses to derive optimal parameter strategies across diverse on-chain mechanisms. The research provides provably secure parameter configurations for Ethereum and variants such as Arbitrum, ensuring minimum fee revenue under high network loads to deter abuse. Ultimately, this approach effectively balances system efficiency with long-term security.

0 citationsRead paper

Priority Gas Auction Cadence and Searcher Competition: Evidence from Flashblocks on Base

Oct 02, 2026

This study investigates the causal impact of shortened auction cycles via Flashblocks on the Base chain upon arbitrageurs’ bidding strategies and competitive dynamics. Methodologically, we construct a difference-in-differences model using purely on-chain address-day panel data. By integrating first-price auction theory with activity-matched control groups, this work provides the first identification of the causal effect of auction cadence on priority fees, revealing that such fees comprise a fixed reserve price and a linear competition premium. Empirical results demonstrate that following the mechanism change, effective priority fees decreased significantly by 59%, accompanied by a substantial reduction in the fee share captured by early blocks. Overall, this research offers critical empirical evidence for optimizing Rollup governance parameters.

0 citationsRead paper

Price Elasticity of Gas Demand on L1 and L2: Evidence from Ethereum and Arbitrum

Jun 11, 2026

This study provides the first empirical identification of the price elasticity of gas demand on Ethereum Mainnet (Layer 1) and Arbitrum One (Layer 2), offering micro-level insights for transaction fee mechanism design and resource pricing. Leveraging on-chain data from 2025–2026, the analysis employs a two-way fixed-effects panel regression combined with an instrumental variables approach to address endogeneity, alongside behavioral clustering and resource-type decomposition. The results reveal an overall elasticity of −0.006 on Layer 1 and −0.036 on Layer 2, with refundable resources on Layer 2 exhibiting a notably higher elasticity of −0.27. Moreover, highly active user clusters demonstrate elasticities up to six times the overall average, underscoring substantial heterogeneity across both resource types and user segments.

0 citationsRead paper

Just-in-Time Resale in an Ahead-of-Time Auction: An Event Study

Mar 20, 2026

This study investigates how the emergence of the instant secondary market Kairos undermines the competitiveness and value capture of Arbitrum’s Timeboost primary auction mechanism. Employing an event study methodology, the analysis integrates bidding behavior, profit attribution, and market dynamics to compare primary and secondary market activity before and after Kairos’ deployment. The research reveals— for the first time—that the instant resale mechanism effectively neutralizes the primary auction’s intended function: the share of total payments captured by the primary auction plummeted from 62.7% to 14.8%, with substantial economic surplus diverted to the secondary market. Building on these findings, the paper proposes novel auction design improvements aimed at recapturing lost value, offering both empirical evidence and theoretical foundations for optimizing on-chain resource allocation mechanisms.

0 citationsRead paper