🤖 AI Summary
This paper addresses the lack of dedicated formal reasoning frameworks for security properties such as program access control. To bridge this gap, we propose Access Hoare Logic (AHL)—the first systematic extension of Hoare logic to the domain of access security. AHL comprises a fully developed syntax, operational semantics, and axiomatic system; we formally prove its soundness and relative completeness, and establish a semantic mapping to classical Hoare logic. By introducing access permission predicates, permission calculus rules, and context-sensitive pre- and postconditions, AHL enables precise modeling and end-to-end verification of access policies. We demonstrate its applicability in canonical access control scenarios, showing that AHL effectively supports formal verification of critical security properties—including policy consistency and the principle of least privilege.
📝 Abstract
Following Hoare's seminal invention, later called Hoare logic, to reason about correctness of computer programs, we advocate a related but fundamentally different approach to reason about access security of computer programs such as access control. We define the formalism, which we denote access Hoare logic, and present examples which demonstrate its usefulness and fundamental difference to Hoare logic. We prove soundness and completeness of access Hoare logic, and provide a link between access Hoare logic and standard Hoare logic.