Names without information: Attention allocation and rent transfer in a zero-fundamental token market

2026-10-01

AI Summary

This study investigates whether name appeal drives prices and investor returns in token markets devoid of fundamentals. Leveraging 458,000 default-template tokens, the authors exploit a natural setting of zero cash flows and uniform code to isolate creator effects. By employing fixed sample splits, creator fixed-effects models, and statistical equivalence tests, the work constructs an empirical framework to rigorously disentangle attention coordination from information preference mechanisms. This paper provides the first empirical separation of these two explanations. The findings reveal that name premia are statistically insignificant, and market competition merely redistributes wealth among buyers without generating real value, thereby offering novel evidence for understanding the pricing of assets lacking fundamental anchors.

Abstract

Asset names are associated with investor trading and asset prices, but where names and issuer quality are formed jointly, information, preference and attention-coordination explanations are difficult to distinguish. We study a token launchpad on which tokens issued under the default template use the same contract code, have a fixed supply and carry no cash flows, while names can be registered at almost no cost, cannot be verified and may be reused. Using all 458,174 default-template tokens launched from February to June 2026 and a sample split by creator entity fixed in advance, we find that the share of tokens attracting an outside buyer rises from 34.9% to 52.8% across name-appeal deciles, but within creator and creation minute the effect of appeal is small and does not replicate in the validation sample. Conditional on early capital inflow and creator fixed effects, the residual effects of names on migration, peak market capitalization and post-peak drawdown are statistically equivalent to zero, and buyers who follow appealing names earn no economically meaningful premium. The same name attracts less capital with each reuse, names whose first token draws more capital are copied sooner, and competition over names mainly transfers wealth among buyers.

Problem

• token market
• asset names
• attention allocation
• rent transfer
• zero-fundamental

Innovation

• Zero-fundamental token market
• Attention allocation
• Rent transfer
• Creator fixed effects
• Name appeal