🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the robustness and leakage-resilient security challenges of device-independent oblivious transfer (DI-OT) in quantum settings. Building upon post-quantum one-way functions, it constructs DI-OT and bit commitment using only trusted classical computation to control untrusted quantum devices. The work introduces a unified protocol framework compatible with both isolated and adaptive leakage models, integrating key techniques including parallel repetition bounds for the Magic Square game, affine consistency checks, and multi-round threshold theorems. It achieves simulation-based security and sequential composition, establishing DI-completeness to support secure computation of arbitrary classical functionalities. Furthermore, the authors construct efficient simulators and DI coin flipping with abort using polynomial device complexity, yielding a provably secure general-purpose computation scheme against static corruption.
📝 Abstract
Assuming post-quantum one-way functions, we construct device-independent (DI) oblivious transfer (OT) and bit commitment: honest parties use only trusted classical computation to operate untrusted quantum devices, which may share arbitrary entanglement and behave non-IID. Security is simulation-based against quantum polynomial-time adversaries and composes sequentially with efficient simulators. One protocol skeleton serves both, in two regimes. With isolated laboratories and coordinate-local measurements in the honest receiver's device, it tolerates a constant rate of honest-device faults. With polylogarithmically many qubits of adaptive leakage between the laboratories and arbitrary joint measurements, it tolerates an inverse-polylogarithmic rate. Each elementary DI call uses a fresh, isolated batch of polylogarithmically many device coordinates, and total device use in the compiled OT protocol is polynomial. The commitment has efficient simulators against both parties and yields DI coin tossing with abort.
Because OT is complete for secure computation, the construction yields a DI protocol, with abort, for every efficiently computable classical functionality on a fixed number of parties, secure against static corruption of any proper subset of them.
The commitment's extractor changes a public parity relation through classical equivocation and leaves the device execution, hence its leakage, unchanged. A commit-and-prove functionality, disjoint audits, and an affine consistency check link the certified correlations to ideal OT. Sender security rests on a selector-aware parallel-repetition bound for the Magic Square game, which we derive from the two-round threshold theorem of Kundu and Tan.