Key-Reuse Vulnerability of Phase-Keyed Fourier-Curve Modulation: Relation Leakage and Key-Refresh Cost on Coded Links

๐Ÿ“… 2026-10-01
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๐Ÿค– AI Summary
This study addresses the data leakage and security failures in phase-shift-keyed Fourier curve modulation for key multiplexing, caused by harmonic coupling. It reveals a mixed-moment leakage mechanism induced by integer relations and constructs a modular relation lattice to characterize exposed symbols. Furthermore, this work proposes non-data-aided attack methods leveraging third- and fourth-order moments to recover relative phases and keys without exhaustive enumeration. By integrating higher-order statistical estimation with LDPC simulations to quantify link security, it demonstrates that a single codeword suffices to reduce an eavesdropperโ€™s block error rate below 0.04. Additionally, the analysis reveals that secure refreshing requires consuming 1.52 times the one-time pad entropy rate, thereby establishing a new paradigm for physical-layer security evaluation.
๐Ÿ“ Abstract
The security of keyed modulation is often argued from the key-space size and the error rate of a key-less receiver. This evidence fails when the key is reused and the waveform is harmonically coupled. For a phase-keyed Fourier-curve constellation, whose $k$ tones share one data parameter, integer relations among the harmonic indices yield data-cancelling mixed moments of the received tones that expose key characters. A modular relation lattice characterizes the exposed characters; for consecutive harmonics, third-order moments recover the relative phases and a fourth-order moment completes the key up to cyclic relabeling whenever its coefficient is nonzero, as in all evaluated settings. A non-data-aided relation-moment estimator turns this leakage into an attack that never enumerates the key space. On a regular $(3,6)$ LDPC-coded link, one key per 168-symbol codeword leaves the eavesdropper a block error rate below $0.04$ at the middle noise level, and the attack meets a predeclared $0.1$ compromise criterion in eleven of twelve operating points. Tangent artificial noise and a harmonic set without relations below order four raise her measured error rate at intermediate reuse lengths but do not remove the one-codeword vulnerability. For a grid of $2^{128}$ protocol keys at the middle noise level, equal-length refresh schedules that keep a $95\%$ lower confidence bound of her block error rate above $0.9$ consume at least $1.52$ fresh key bits per information bit, $1.52$ times the entropy rate of a one-time pad on the data.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Key-Reuse Vulnerability
Phase-Keyed Modulation
Relation Leakage
Key-Refresh Cost
Coded Links
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

Phase-Keyed Fourier-Curve Modulation
Key-Reuse Vulnerability
Relation-Moment Estimator
Modular Relation Lattice
Key-Refresh Cost