Creativity in the Age of AI: Rethinking the Role of Intentional Agency

2026-01-22

AI Summary

This study addresses the limitations of traditional creativity theories, which rely on the Intentional Agent Condition (IAC) and thus struggle to accommodate generative AI systems. By integrating large-scale corpus analysis with conceptual engineering in philosophy, the paper proposes a revised criterion for creativity: the reliable generation of outputs that are both novel and valuable. It argues for replacing IAC with a general “consistency requirement” at the foundational level, while retaining IAC only in specific domains where intentional agency remains pertinent. The research further uncovers cognitive biases induced by IAC in the context of AI and presents empirical evidence that public perception is increasingly willing to ascribe creativity to non-intentional AI systems. The proposed framework better aligns with the functional and social demands of the AI era.

Technology Category

• Cognitive Modeling & Cognitive Systems: Computational Creativity
• Philosophy and Ethics of AI: Artificial General Intelligence
• Humans and AI: Other Foundations of Human Computation & AI

Application Category

• Social Networks and Social Media: Generative AI / large language models and their impact on social systems
• Responsible Web: Machine-in-the-loop, human agency and autonomy
• Semantics and Knowledge: Data modeling to support human-machine intelligence, including LLMs agents, intelligent system behavior, explanations, and user-friendly interactions

Abstract

Many theorists of creativity maintain that intentional agency is a necessary condition of creativity. We argue that this requirement, which we call the Intentional Agency Condition (IAC), should be rejected as a general condition of creativity, while retaining its relevance in specific contexts. We show that recent advances in generative AI have rendered the IAC increasingly problematic, both descriptively and functionally. We offer two reasons for abandoning it at the general level. First, we present corpus evidence indicating that authors and journalists are increasingly comfortable ascribing creativity to generative AI, despite its lack of intentional agency. This development places pressure on the linguistic intuitions that have traditionally been taken to support the IAC. Second, drawing on the method of conceptual engineering, we argue that the IAC no longer fulfils its core social function. Rather than facilitating the identification and encouragement of reliable sources of novel and valuable products, it now feeds into biases that distort our assessments of AI-generated outputs. We therefore propose replacing the IAC with a consistency requirement, according to which creativity tracks the reliable generation of novel and valuable products. Nonetheless, we explain why the IAC should be retained in specific local domains.

Problem

• creativity
• intentional agency
• generative AI
• conceptual engineering
• artificial intelligence

Innovation

• intentional agency
• generative AI
• creativity
• conceptual engineering
• consistency requirement