Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
Dual-class shares
firm-specific investments
agency costs
innovative output
The Dynamic Trade-Off of Dual-Class Shares
🤖 AI Summary
本文使用52年的美国双层股权结构公司数据，分析了这种结构在控制权与所有权分离下的动态权衡，发现其对公司估值和创新产出的影响。
📝 Abstract
Dual-class shares allocate control to founders whose firm-specific investments drive firm value but separate control from ownership, raising agency costs. We analyze this trade-off dynamically. Using new data on US dual-class firms spanning 52 years and difference-in-differences designs, we show that valuations rise following dual-class recapitalizations but decline over time, whereas innovative output increases persistently. These effects are concentrated in industries with greater firm-specific investments. We find corresponding results for stock unifications. Investment by mature dual-class firms is less sensitive to opportunities and voting premia increase with maturity. Our results support dynamic treatment effects and yield new policy implications.
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
Dual-class shares
Innovative output
Dynamic treatment effects
Firm-specific investments
🔎 Similar Papers
No similar papers found.
💼 Related Jobs
No related jobs found.
