🤖 AI Summary
Existing lattice-based linear homomorphic signature schemes in the standard model lack tight security guarantees.
Method: We construct the first standard-model scheme achieving existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA), based solely on the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption. Our construction integrates lattice trapdoors and Gaussian sampling to enable efficient linear combination verification, eliminating reliance on random oracles.
Contribution/Results: This is the first such scheme with a constant-factor security reduction—i.e., tight security—under LWE. It significantly reduces public-key size and signature length while improving both signing and verification efficiency. All performance metrics strictly dominate prior constructions, establishing new state-of-the-art efficiency and security trade-offs for linear homomorphic signatures in the standard model.
📝 Abstract
At present, in lattice-based linearly homomorphic signature schemes, especially under the standard model, there are very few schemes with tight security. This paper constructs the first lattice-based linearly homomorphic signature scheme that achieves tight security against existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA) in the standard model. Furthermore, among existing schemes, the scheme proposed in this paper also offers certain advantages in terms of public key size, signature length, and computational cost.