Gradient Dynamics in First-Price Auctions: Iterative Strategy Elimination via Cubic Potentials

πŸ“… 2026-06-03
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This study investigates the long-term behavior of buyers employing online gradient ascent to learn bidding strategies in discretized first-price auctions under complete information. By constructing a potential-based analytical framework and introducing a novel class of cubic candidate potential functions, the work characterizes the no-regret property of quadratic strategy updates over the probability simplex and iteratively eliminates inefficient strategies in a time-averaged sense. The theoretical analysis demonstrates that this learning dynamic converges, in time average, to an allocation outcome closely approximating that of a second-price auction, thereby revealing that simple learning rules can spontaneously achieve near-socially optimal outcomes without explicit coordination or mechanism design.
πŸ“ Abstract
We show that in discretised first-price auctions with complete information, if the buyers learn to bid with online gradient ascent, in time-average the outcome is (almost) the efficient outcome of the second-price auction. Our proof rests on two novel innovations in the analysis of online gradient ascent in normal-form games, which may be useful in a wider range of applications. First, we develop a potential-function-based argument for the analysis of gradient ascent in normal-form games, allowing us to deduce that certain strategies will not be played in time-average. We provide sufficient conditions which ensure this argument can be applied iteratively, resulting in a procedure reminiscent of iterative elimination of dominated strategies. Second, we develop a novel class of cubic "candidate potential functions", classifying a family of quadratic strategy modifications on the probability simplex against which online gradient ascent incurs no regret.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

first-price auctions
gradient dynamics
online learning
potential functions
strategy elimination
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

potential function
online gradient ascent
iterative elimination
cubic potentials
no-regret learning
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