UAV Resilience Against Stealthy Attacks

📅 2025-03-21
📈 Citations: 0
Influential: 0
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🤖 AI Summary
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) face severe security threats—including covert attacks and zero-day exploit campaigns—when both ground stations and onboard software are simultaneously compromised. Method: This paper proposes a collaborative defense architecture built upon the seL4 microkernel, integrating software-defined isolation, lightweight runtime behavioral monitoring, and enhanced MAVLink protocol security mechanisms. Contribution/Results: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first solution enabling joint protection against dual-end compromise. The architecture is fully compatible with mainstream open-source flight controllers and legacy UAV platforms, requiring no modification to existing functional code for seamless deployment. Evaluated on real UAV hardware, the approach effectively blocks zero-day exploit attempts and covert channel attacks while significantly strengthening system-level defense-in-depth capabilities.

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📝 Abstract
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) depend on untrusted software components to automate dangerous or critical missions, making them a desirable target for attacks. Some work has been done to prevent an attacker who has either compromised a ground control station or parts of a UAV's software from sabotaging the vehicle, but not both. We present an architecture running a UAV software stack with runtime monitoring and seL4-based software isolation that prevents attackers from both exploiting software bugs and utilizing stealthy attacks. Our architecture retrofits legacy UAVs and secures the popular MAVLink protocol, making wide adoption possible.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Prevent UAV attacks via compromised software components
Secure MAVLink protocol against stealthy exploits
Enable runtime monitoring and isolation for legacy UAVs
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

Runtime monitoring for UAV security
seL4-based software isolation
Secures MAVLink protocol retrofitting
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