🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the vulnerability of V2X communication systems to GNSS spoofing attacks, which exploit the reliance on Global Navigation Satellite Systems for spatiotemporal information and pose serious threats to traffic safety. The authors propose a physical-layer GNSS spoofing method leveraging a low-cost software-defined radio (HackRF One) to generate high-fidelity GPS baseband signals that emulate false trajectories under high-speed mobility scenarios. By integrating Haversine distance computation, constant-velocity modeling, and linear interpolation, the approach effectively synthesizes realistic spoofed signals. For the first time, the attack is validated on real-world Commsignia onboard units (OBUs) and roadside units (RSUs), demonstrating significant degradation of cooperative perception services with minimal detectability. Successful spoofing is achieved at speeds of 90, 145, and 200 km/h, underscoring the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to protect the integrity of positional data in current V2X deployments.
📝 Abstract
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) constitute a core technology for delivering crucial positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services in the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) domain, where they are indispensable for generating Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAM) that uphold network reliability and vehicular safety. Yet, GNSS signals are acutely exposed to spoofing, an advanced attack in which an adversary transmits crafted signals that replicate legitimate satellite characteristics, misleading the receiver into computing a false position. This work presents a methodology for conducting physical spoofing with inexpensive Software Defined Radio (SDR), describing a coordinate generation pipeline that employs Haversine-based distance calculations, temporal discretization to emulate constant velocity, and linear interpolation to produce high-fidelity GPS baseband signals. The proposed attack is experimentally validated on real Commsignia OnBoard Unit (OBU) and RoadSide Unit (RSU) devices using a HackRF One across three scenarios that emulate synthetic trajectories at steady speeds of 90 km/h, 145 km/h, and 200 km/h. The most significant contribution of this paper is the demonstration that V2X communications are not secured, as they are susceptible to GNSS spoofing attacks, which cause service degradation without being detected.