🤖 AI Summary
Traditional control of cryptographic assets relies on permanent private key possession, which hinders regulatory compliance, conditional delegation, and on-chain revocable transfers. This work proposes CT-DAP, a novel approach introducing dormant authorization paths based on destructible authorization factors jointly held by the user and an independent custodian. These paths activate asset control upon predefined conditions and support stateless revocation. The scheme integrates deterministic key derivation, context isolation, and cryptographic primitives—including AES-GCM-SIV, HKDF, Argon2id, and SHA-256—to construct the ACE-GF framework. Under standard security assumptions, ACE-GF achieves sub-second activation latency while enabling flexible trade-offs between security and performance.
📝 Abstract
Control of encrypted digital assets is traditionally equated with permanent possession of private keys, a model that precludes regulatory supervision, conditional delegation, and legally compliant transfer at the cryptographic layer. Existing remedies (multi-signature schemes, threshold signatures, smart contracts, custodial delegation) require persistent key exposure, on-chain state mutation, or trusted intermediaries. We introduce Condition-Triggered Dormant Authorization Paths (CT-DAP), a cryptographic asset control method built on destructible authorization factors and parameterized by a root-derivable framework satisfying deterministic key derivation, context-isolated capability generation, and authorization-bound revocation. Under CT-DAP, control rights are dormant authorization paths composed of user-held credentials and administrative factors held by independent custodians; a path remains cryptographically inactive until all factors are simultaneously available. Upon verification of predefined conditions (e.g., user consent, inheritance events, time-based triggers), the corresponding factor is released, activating the path. Revocation is achieved by destroying factors, rendering the path permanently unusable without altering the cryptographic root. We formalize the threat model, define security games for unauthorized control resistance, path isolation, and stateless revocation, and prove security under standard assumptions (AEAD security of AES-GCM-SIV, PRF security of HKDF, memory-hardness of Argon2id, collision resistance of SHA-256). We instantiate CT-DAP using the Atomic Cryptographic Entity Generative Framework (ACE-GF) and evaluate performance, demonstrating sub-second activation latency with configurable security-performance trade-offs.