🤖 AI Summary
This paper addresses a novel class of miner-extractable value (MEV) problems in multi-concurrent-proposer blockchains—arising from delayed execution-order finality—including simultaneous frontrunning, proposer-to-proposer auctions, and availability-proof-driven timing races. We propose a harm-normalized delay-and-inclusion model and derive a closed-form delay envelope ( M( au) ) to characterize equilibrium properties of censorship, replication, and auction games. Our method integrates deterministic priority DAG-based scheduling with repetition-aware payment mechanisms to suppress simultaneous MEV. The approach unifies game-theoretic modeling, latency analysis, protocol-layer incentive design, and equilibrium analysis. Theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation demonstrate that, without relying on centralized block builders, specific protocol configurations effectively mitigate concurrency-specific MEV while preserving security guarantees and achieving high throughput.
📝 Abstract
We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of sequential chains and introduces new MEV channels, including same tick duplicate steals, proposer to proposer auctions, and timing races driven by proof of availability latency. We develop a hazard normalized model of delay and inclusion, derive a closed form delay envelope (M(τ)), and characterize equilibria for censorship, duplication, and auction games. We show how deterministic priority DAG scheduling and duplicate aware payouts neutralize same tick MEV while preserving throughput, identifying simple protocol configurations to mitigate MCP specific extraction without centralized builders.