🤖 AI Summary
Resource-constrained embedded IoT devices in cloud-assisted systems face severe key-exposure risks, yet existing forward-secure signature schemes incur prohibitive computational and storage overheads, while cloud-assisted approaches rely on centralized or non-colluding semi-honest server assumptions. Method: We propose a lightweight, high-resilience digital signature framework featuring (i) the novel LRSHA/FLRSHA dual-mechanism with commitment separation to drastically reduce signing cost; (ii) a hardware-assisted distributed server architecture eliminating reliance on trusted central authorities or non-collusion assumptions; and (iii) tight integration of HSM coordination, secret key sharding, lightweight elliptic curves, and AVR assembly-level optimization. Contribution/Results: Our implementation achieves millisecond-scale forward-secure signing on 8-bit AVR microcontrollers, with both keys and signatures compressed to the hundred-byte level. We provide formal security proofs and open-source the implementation, demonstrating cross-platform efficiency and practicality.
📝 Abstract
Digital signatures provide scalable authentication with non-repudiation and are vital tools for the Internet of Things (IoT). Many IoT applications harbor vast quantities of resource-limited devices often used with cloud computing. However, key compromises (e.g., physical, malware) pose a significant threat to IoTs due to increased attack vectors and open operational environments. Forward security and distributed key management are critical breach-resilient countermeasures to mitigate such threats. Yet forward-secure signatures are exorbitantly costly for low-end IoTs, while cloud-assisted approaches suffer from centrality or non-colluding semi-honest servers. In this work, we create two novel digital signatures called Lightweight and Resilient Signatures with Hardware Assistance (LRSHA) and its Forward-secure version (FLRSHA). They offer a near-optimally efficient signing with small keys and signature sizes. We synergize various design strategies, such as commitment separation to eliminate costly signing operations and hardware-assisted distributed servers to enable breach-resilient verification. Our schemes achieve magnitudes of faster forward-secure signing and compact key/signature sizes without suffering from strong security assumptions (non-colluding, central servers) or a heavy burden on the verifier (extreme storage, computation). We formally prove the security of our schemes and validate their performance with full-fledged open-source implementations on both commodity hardware and 8-bit AVR microcontrollers.