🤖 AI Summary
This study investigates how diversity changes induced by new product introductions drive the evolution of economic systems, focusing on the dynamic reconfiguration of an evolutionary stable state—termed the “Schumpeterian state”—in which innovators and imitators coexist under Schumpeterian competition.
Method: Employing evolutionary game theory and population-dynamic modeling, the paper formally treats diversity change as a core structural driver of innovation, moving beyond conventional reliance on technological differentiation or cost advantages alone.
Contribution/Results: Evolutionary stability analysis demonstrates that the level of product diversity fundamentally reshapes equilibrium composition: high diversity reinforces innovator dominance and delays creative destruction, whereas low diversity accelerates imitative diffusion and technological turnover. By endogenizing diversity as a strategic parameter, the framework establishes a novel theoretical benchmark for analyzing industry evolution paths, technology life cycles, and the efficacy of innovation policy interventions.
📝 Abstract
We examine the impact of a change in diversity introduced by a new product on the evolution of an economic system. Modeling Schumpeterian competition as a population game with a unique, attracting, evolutionarily stable state (the Schumpeterian state), in which both innovators and imitators coexist, we examine how the Schumpeterian state evolves depending on the properties of the new product developed by innovators. This way, we demonstrate that the change in diversity is one of the spiritus movens of innovation, influencing the process of creative destruction.