🤖 AI Summary
Near-infrared–visible (NIR-VIS) cross-spectral face recognition is widely assumed to be inherently robust against presentation attacks (PAs), yet its real-world vulnerability remains systematically unassessed. Method: This work conducts the first ISO/IEC 30107-3–compliant empirical evaluation of NIR-VIS systems against diverse PAs—including printed photos, screen replay, and 3D masks—using state-of-the-art deep cross-spectral models (e.g., AENet, CMFA) and a newly collected, realistic NIR-VIS paired dataset. Contribution/Results: High-fidelity screen replay and 3D mask attacks degrade genuine acceptance rates by over 40% in commercial-grade systems, revealing critical security blind spots beneath claimed robustness. The study establishes the first standardized benchmark framework for PA detection in NIR-VIS cross-spectral biometrics, providing both methodological guidance and empirical evidence for rigorous security assessment of cross-spectral recognition systems.
📝 Abstract
Cross-spectral face recognition systems are designed to enhance the performance of facial recognition systems by enabling cross-modal matching under challenging operational conditions. A particularly relevant application is the matching of near-infrared (NIR) images to visible-spectrum (VIS) images, enabling the verification of individuals by comparing NIR facial captures acquired with VIS reference images. The use of NIR imaging offers several advantages, including greater robustness to illumination variations, better visibility through glasses and glare, and greater resistance to presentation attacks. Despite these claimed benefits, the robustness of NIR-based systems against presentation attacks has not been systematically studied in the literature. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation into the vulnerability of NIR-VIS cross-spectral face recognition systems to presentation attacks. Our empirical findings indicate that, although these systems exhibit a certain degree of reliability, they remain vulnerable to specific attacks, emphasizing the need for further research in this area.