Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
Electromagnetic Detection
Hardware Trojans
Kernel Memory
Side-channels
Assessing Runtime Electromagnetic Detection of CPU Hardware Trojans Targeting Kernel Memory
🤖 AI Summary
本文研究使用电磁辐射检测CPU硬件木马，针对内核内存攻击，通过分析处理器的电磁发射来实时检测硬件木马。
📝 Abstract
Side-channels are a promising approach for hardware trojan detection, as they can passively reveal malicious hardware activity without requiring additional circuitry or destructive analysis of the device under test. This work investigates the use of electromagnetic (EM) emanations for runtime detection of hardware trojan attacks. Using an open-source hardware trojan that implements an arbitrary memory-write primitive, we tamper with the kernel memory of a Linux system running on a RISC-V microarchitecture and perform a real-time baseline detection using the processor's EM emissions. Our results indicate that, under certain conditions, hardware trojans can be detected indirectly through the anomalous software behavior they enable.
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
Electromagnetic Emanations
Runtime Detection
Hardware Trojan
Kernel Memory
Side-channels
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