rApp/xApp Attestation: A New Security Use Case for O-RAN

2026-09-21

AI Summary

本文针对O-RAN架构下RIC生态系统面临的运行时安全风险，通过引入rApp/xApp认证机制来验证应用程序的完整性，利用现有技术并通过特定模块和接口实现。

Abstract

The disaggregation and softwarization introduced by the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) architecture enable multi-vendor innovation but also expose the RAN Intelligent Controller (RIC) ecosystem to new runtime security risks. Existing O-RAN specifications define strong safeguards for onboarding, authentication, identity management, and secure communication; however, they do not provide a concrete mechanism for verifying whether deployed rApps and xApps remain in their intended, untampered state during operation. This paper introduces rApp/xApp attestation as a RIC-native O-RAN security use case for runtime integrity verification. Rather than proposing a new cryptographic protocol, the work defines how existing integrity verification techniques can be integrated into O-RAN through attestation modules, attestation agents, RIC application interfaces, and SMO-driven policy coordination. We map the use case to relevant O-RAN Alliance working groups, identify required standardization extensions, and demonstrate feasibility through a lightweight hash-based prototype implemented on the Near-RT RIC platform. Experimental results show attestation latencies below 40 ms across multiple cryptographic hash functions, indicating that runtime attestation can be performed without disrupting time-sensitive RIC operations when appropriately scheduled. Finally, we discuss remaining technical and standardization challenges, including trusted verification, known-good runtime states, scalability, mitigation policies, and future hybrid attestation mechanisms.

Problem

• O-RAN
• runtime security
• integrity verification
• rApps
• xApps

Innovation

• rApp/xApp Attestation
• Runtime Integrity Verification
• O-RAN Security
• Attestation Module
• Lightweight Hash-based Prototype