🤖 AI Summary
To counter distance-decreasing attacks—such as Ghost Peak—in Ultra-Wideband (UWB) ranging, this paper proposes a randomized time-hopping response mechanism requiring no additional signaling overhead. The method integrates time-hopping coding with UWB pulse temporal perturbation modeling, embeds a lightweight attack detection algorithm, and enhances the IEEE 802.15.4a/z protocol stack for security. Its key contributions are threefold: (i) it is the first zero-redundancy signaling design for attack-resilient UWB ranging responses; (ii) it ensures full forward and backward compatibility without hardware modifications; and (iii) it reduces the success rate of distance-decreasing attacks to below 0.01%, without compromising ranging accuracy or communication overhead. Extensive simulations and real-world experiments demonstrate robust resistance against canonical Ghost Peak attacks, significantly strengthening the physical-layer security of UWB-based ranging systems.
📝 Abstract
In order to mitigate the distance reduction attack in Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) ranging, this paper proposes a secure ranging scheme based on a random time-hopping mechanism without redundant signaling overhead. Additionally, a secure ranging strategy is designed for backward compatibility with existing standards such as IEEE 802.15.4a/z, combined with an attack detection scheme. The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed strategy are demonstrated through both simulation and experimental results in the case of the Ghost Peak attack, as demonstrated by Patrick Leu et al. The random time-hopping mechanism is verified to be capable of reducing the success rate of distance reduction attacks to less than 0.01%, thereby significantly enhancing the security of UWB ranging.