🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the challenge of imperfect sender control over information leakage in Bayesian persuasion by proposing an axiomatic framework for robust persuasion grounded in worst-case analysis. By characterizing the set of feasible information structures and employing axiomatic modeling, this work systematically evaluates optimal strategies across diverse leakage scenarios. The resulting general model of robust Bayesian persuasion not only advances the theoretical foundations of mechanism design under incomplete control but also examines a broad spectrum of information leakage instances. Consequently, this research establishes a novel analytical paradigm and provides rigorous theoretical support for understanding strategic communication when senders possess only partial control over information disclosure.
📝 Abstract
We develop an axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion where the sender cannot fully control the information available to the receiver. After selecting an information structure, the sender expects that more informative structures might be implemented. We model this by allowing the sender to assess each information structure under worst-case information leakage, represented by a set of more informative structures. The model encompasses a wide range of examples of information leakage, which we also explore.