Ownership Networks and Economic Power in the Italian Energy Sector

2026-05-25

AI Summary

This study investigates the actual distribution of economic power in Italy’s energy sector under financialization and the mechanisms underlying the weakening of state strategic control. By constructing a weighted directed ownership network that integrates institutional investor shareholding data, the authors propose the Aggregated Network Power Index (A-NPI) and Aggregated Network Power Flow (A-NPF) to translate micro-level control relations into macro-level power metrics that reflect sectoral importance. The analysis reveals a “governance paradox”: despite the state holding majority equity stakes, transnational institutional investors erode public strategic dominance through common ownership, leading to implicit strategic convergence in infrastructure management. This framework offers a novel methodological approach for assessing how financialization reshapes control over strategically vital industries.

Abstract

The energy sector is a cornerstone of national strategic autonomy, yet its increasing financialization has transformed ownership structures into complex networked configurations. This paper investigates the distribution of economic power in the Italian energy sector by introducing two sector-level extensions of the Network Power framework: the Aggregate Network Power Index (A-NPI) and the Aggregate Network Power Flow (A-NPF). Unlike traditional macro-level measures, these indices aggregate firm-level control and influence into a systemic framework that accounts for the relative economic weight of each operator. Applying this framework to the Italian case reveals a "Governance Paradox": while the State retains formal majority ownership, the sector's deepening reliance on global capital markets and the pervasive presence of common ownership by transnational institutional investors have progressively hollowed out public strategic direction. The results show that capital centralization enables global financial actors to internalize sectoral competition, fostering a regime of tacit strategic convergence in the management of critical infrastructure. This configuration challenges European strategic autonomy, raising questions about the adequacy of traditional Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) screening and antitrust tools in addressing the systemic influence exerted through networked ownership structures.

Problem

• ownership networks
• economic power
• energy sector
• strategic autonomy
• common ownership

Innovation

• Network Power
• Aggregate Network Power Index
• ownership networks
• economic power
• common ownership