Partially Active Automated Market Makers

📅 2026-02-10
📈 Citations: 0
✨ Influential: 0
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🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the losses incurred by liquidity providers in automated market makers (AMMs) due to adverse selection, commonly quantified by loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR). To mitigate this issue, the paper proposes a partially active AMM mechanism that partitions liquidity reserves into active and passive components, with only the active portion participating in trades. The proportion of active liquidity is dynamically adjusted at the beginning of each block. Drawing inspiration from index tracking optimization, this approach simultaneously reduces LVR and constrains deviations of asset weights from a target portfolio allocation. Theoretical analysis and empirical experiments demonstrate that, compared to conventional constant-function market makers (CFMMs), the proposed mechanism significantly enhances liquidity provider wealth while effectively balancing the trade-off between adverse selection costs and portfolio drift.

Technology Category

Multiagent Systems: Mechanism DesignMachine Learning: Active LearningGame Theory and Economic Paradigms: Mechanism Design

Application Category

Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Uses of LLMs and GenAI for marketplace design, bidding, and strategic interactionsSecurity and Privacy: Cryptocurrency and smart contractsUser Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Attacks and countermeasures in recommendation systems
📝 Abstract
We introduce a new class of automated market maker (AMM), the \emph{partially active automated market maker} (PA-AMM). PA-AMM divides its reserves into two parts, the active and the passive parts, and uses only the active part for trading. At the top of every block, such a division is done again to keep the active reserves always being \(\lambda\)-portion of total reserves, where \(\lambda \in (0, 1]\) is an activeness parameter. We show that this simple mechanism reduces adverse selection costs, measured by loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR), and thereby improves the wealth of liquidity providers (LPs) relative to plain constant-function market makers (CFMMs). As a trade-off, the asset weights within a PA-AMM pool may deviate from their target weights implied by its invariant curve. Motivated by the optimal index-tracking problem literature, we also propose and solve an optimization problem that balances such deviation and the reduction of LVR.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

automated market maker
adverse selection
loss-versus-rebalancing
liquidity providers
asset weights deviation
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

Partially Active AMM
Loss-Versus-Rebalancing
Liquidity Provider Wealth
Adverse Selection
Index Tracking Optimization