🤖 AI Summary
This study examines how nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) strategically time corporate annual general meetings (AGMs) to maximize advocacy impact. Method: Leveraging an event study of 2,500 NGO corporate advocacy actions, a difference-in-differences design, textual analysis, and panel regressions, the paper identifies—empirically for the first time—the critical inflection point in NGO strategy shifting from “pursuing media visibility” to “influencing AGM voting outcomes.” Contribution/Results: Launching campaigns on AGM day increases media coverage sixfold and significantly triggers subsequent shareholder proposals and consumer boycotts. However, this timing strategy only meaningfully improves same-year AGM shareholder support rates once NGOs have accumulated sufficient reputational capital—revealing a reputation-driven dynamic trade-off. The study innovatively integrates timing choice, reputational capital, and governance influence into a unified analytical framework, offering a novel paradigm for understanding the strategic evolution of nonstate actors in corporate governance.
📝 Abstract
We analyze the timing of NGO campaigns to shed light on NGOs' strategies and how they evolve over time. Data from 2,500 campaigns show that NGOs are six times more likely to launch campaigns on their target's Annual General Meeting (AGM) date. Although this strategy increases media exposure and stakeholder scrutiny, resulting in consumer backlash and related shareholder proposals at the following AGM of the targeted firm, it has no impact on current AGM votes. As NGOs build reputational capital, they adjust their timing to influence AGM votes, revealing the trade-offs they face to drive corporate change.