🤖 AI Summary
In game theory, a fundamental disconnect exists between behavioral explanations—based on players’ observed payoffs—and normative welfare assessments—based on their true underlying utilities. This impedes coherent analysis when actual behavior deviates systematically from rationality due to cognitive limitations or perception biases.
Method: We propose the δ-rational game framework, which explicitly models bounded rationality via a rationality deviation parameter δ and an associated distortion function mapping true utilities to distorted (observed) payoffs. Behavior is rationalized using distorted payoffs, while welfare evaluation remains grounded in true utilities.
Contribution/Results: We rigorously prove existence of δ-rational equilibria and show that Nash equilibria emerge as the special case when δ = 0. By unifying payoff distortion under a tunable rationality parameter, our framework bridges descriptive behavioral modeling and prescriptive welfare analysis. It provides a novel paradigm for strategic modeling of AI agents operating under bounded rationality, enabling simultaneous prediction of behavior and evaluation of social welfare.
📝 Abstract
A distortion function, which captures the payoff gap between a player's actual payoff and her true payoff, is introduced and used to analyze games. In our proposed framework, we argue that players'actual payoff functions should be used to explain and predict their behaviors, while their true payoff functions should be used to conduct welfare analysis of the outcomes.