🤖 AI Summary
Mechanical interpretability (MI) research suffers from ambiguities in its implicit assumptions, core concepts, and explanatory strategies, necessitating systematic epistemic and ethical evaluation. This paper argues that philosophy must move beyond external critique to become a deep collaborative partner in MI practice—employing causal mechanism analysis, conceptual clarification, and thought experiments to reconstruct foundational notions such as “mechanism,” “explanation,” and “understanding,” and to diagnose recurrent theoretical dilemmas in neural network interpretability. We identify fundamental challenges concerning cognitive foundations (e.g., criteria for explanatory sufficiency) and ethical implications (e.g., accountability attribution and the transparency illusion). The contribution is the first systematic “philosophy–engineering” co-design framework, providing conceptual tools and methodological grounding for developing rigorous, accountable AI explanation theories. (149 words)
📝 Abstract
Mechanistic interpretability (MI) aims to explain how neural networks work by uncovering their underlying causal mechanisms. As the field grows in influence, it is increasingly important to examine not just models themselves, but the assumptions, concepts and explanatory strategies implicit in MI research. We argue that mechanistic interpretability needs philosophy: not as an afterthought, but as an ongoing partner in clarifying its concepts, refining its methods, and assessing the epistemic and ethical stakes of interpreting AI systems. Taking three open problems from the MI literature as examples, this position paper illustrates the value philosophy can add to MI research, and outlines a path toward deeper interdisciplinary dialogue.