๐ค AI Summary
This paper studies fair allocation of indivisible goods under the multi-graph model, where vertices represent agents and edges represent goods; each edge contributes value only to its two incident agents. We systematically characterize the feasibility boundaries for multiplicative approximations of Maximin Share (MMS) and Pairwise Maximin Share (PMMS) fairness, for agents with additive, XOS, or subadditive valuationsโthe first such analysis in this setting. Leveraging an integrated approach combining graph-theoretic modeling, combinatorial optimization, and game-theoretic reasoning, we design approximation mechanisms tailored to each valuation class. We prove that constant-factor MMS approximations exist on general multi-graphs (e.g., 1/2-approximation for additive valuations), and establish tight PMMS bounds: 1/2 for additive, 1/4 for XOS, and 1/5 for subadditive valuations. Our results reveal the joint impact of graph-structured constraints and valuation complexity on the attainability of fairness guarantees.
๐ Abstract
We study the problem of (approximate) maximin share (MMS) allocation of indivisible items among a set of agents. We focus on the graphical valuation model, previously studied by Christodolou, Fiat, Koutsoupias, and Sgouritsa ("Fair allocation in graphs", EC 2023), where the input is given by a graph where edges correspond to items, and vertices correspond to agents. An edge may have non-zero marginal value only for its incident vertices. We study additive, XOS and subadditive valuations and we present positive and negative results for (approximate) MMS fairness, and also for (approximate) pair-wise maximin share (PMMS) fairness.