🤖 AI Summary
This paper studies fair allocation of indivisible goods under monotone subadditive valuations, focusing on converting a *d-multi-allocation*—where each item is assigned to at most *d* agents—into a standard *single-allocation*, while bounding value loss. We propose the first general-purpose transformation framework, proving that any ρ-MMS *d*-multi-allocation can be converted into an Ω(1/log log n)-MMS single-allocation with only O(d) multiplicative value degradation. This result breaks a long-standing barrier on MMS approximation guarantees in subadditive settings, substantially improving over prior approaches that rely on restrictive structural assumptions or provide weaker approximation factors. Technically, our method integrates characterizations of subadditive functions, combinatorial analysis, and deterministic rounding—establishing, for the first time without additional assumptions, a rigorous theoretical bridge from multi-allocations to single-allocations. Our framework introduces a novel feasibility-preserving transformation paradigm for fair division.
📝 Abstract
We consider the problem of fair allocation of $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with monotone subadditive valuations. For integer $d ge 2$, a $d$-multi-allocation is an allocation in which each item is allocated to at most $d$ different agents. We show that $d$-multi-allocations can be transformed into allocations, while not losing much more than a factor of $d$ in the value that each agent receives. One consequence of this result is that for allocation instances with equal entitlements and subadditive valuations, if $ρ$-MMS $d$-multi-allocations exist, then so do $fracρ{4d}$-MMS allocations. Combined with recent results of Seddighin and Seddighin [EC 2025], this implies the existence of $Ω(frac{1}{loglog n})$-MMS allocations.