π€ AI Summary
This work addresses the problem of excessive disclosure of user context in cross-domain data requests by proposing the Provenance Preserving Chronicles (PPC) protocol, which establishes a user-sovereign identity model grounded in temporal knowledge graphs. Integrating relation-aware views, domain ontologies, and explicit authorization workflows, PPC employs federated access control and a two-phase disclosure mechanism to share only the minimal subset of data necessary for a given task while enabling verifiable provenance. The study introduces the first formal framework for the cross-domain minimal disclosure problem, bridging a critical gap in holder-centric sovereignty design within blockchain and peer-to-peer systems. A prototype implementation demonstrates the protocolβs effectiveness in preserving data sovereignty and ensuring regulatory compliance.
π Abstract
Modern AI systems bring societal risks such as mass surveillance, extreme concentrations of power, and loss of user autonomy---calling into question a model where third-parties collect and control massive amounts of user data. Users require a sovereign system to securely own, govern, and disclose their context while remaining compliant across regulated domains with strict provenance, interpretability, and policy adherence. Perspective-aware AI approaches this by transforming a user's aggregated personal data into a structured identity model called a \emph{Chronicle}: a temporal knowledge graph that represents and grows with the user. Chronicles support the secure disclosure of context across federated networks. A Chronicle holder may expose a queryable, authorized view that a third-party agent may consult without centralizing anyone's data. This paper explores the problem of minimum-necessary disclosure across domain boundaries: when a requester's agent queries a Chronicle, how can the system constrain its response to release only what the requester's relationship, stated purpose, and specific task require? We propose \textbf{Provenance Preserving Chronicles} (PPC), a federated protocol that compiles each holder's Chronicle into a compact \emph{authorized evidence subgraph} governed by one rule: \emph{share no more than the request requires}. Holders keep local sovereignty; an access controller projects relationship-aware views over domain-expert ontologies; and a two-phase flow returns provenance-linked text first, releasing raw artifacts only after explicit holder approval. We frame the problem, map gaps in blockchain, P2P, and holder-sovereign designs, define the core constructs, and sketch the protocol with an explicit threat model.