Distributive Politics, Representation, and Redistricting

2026-04-01

AI Summary

This study examines how redistricting affects minority political influence and welfare through dual channels: descriptive representation (candidate identity) and substantive representation (policy competition). The authors develop a multi-district game-theoretic model incorporating primaries, general elections, and targeted transfers, endogenizing voter pivotality and electoral institutions. For the first time, both forms of representation are integrated into a unified analytical framework, revealing synergies and tensions between “packing” and “cracking” strategies. The analysis demonstrates that minority welfare exhibits a non-monotonic relationship with geographic concentration and identifies conditions under which majority–minority districts enhance minority welfare. Notably, it shows that dispersed spatial distribution can sometimes amplify minority political influence, offering theoretical foundations for equitable districting practices.

Technology Category

• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Fair Division
• Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Preferences
• Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization: Distributed CSP/Optimization

Application Category

• Web Mining and Content Analysis: Content-based information diffusion
• User Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Fairness-aware retrieval and ranking
• Social Networks and Social Media: Media and governance, opinion dynamics, filter bubbles, polarization

Abstract

We develop a theory of distributive competition under redistricting that explains both electoral outcomes and the equilibrium allocation of policy benefits by endogenizing voter pivotality. In a multi-district model with primaries, general elections, and group-targeted transfers, districting shapes political influence through two channels: a selection channel for descriptive representation (who wins office) and a competition channel for substantive representation (who receives policy benefits). District composition alters candidate matchups, shifting voter responsiveness and political leverage, and each channel alone yields distinct predictions about whether packing or cracking voters is optimal. For minority voters, the welfare effects of districting depend on electoral leverage, preferences over descriptive versus partisan representation, primary rules, and competitiveness. The channels align on packing when minorities are electorally weak and value descriptive representation, and align on cracking when minorities are electorally pivotal and prioritize partisan outcomes. When the channels diverge, or when endogenous feedback reshapes electoral leverage, minority welfare can be nonmonotonic in voter concentration. Our results identify when majority-minority districts enhance minority welfare and when dispersion strengthens political influence.

Problem

• redistricting
• distributive politics
• minority representation
• electoral leverage
• descriptive representation

Innovation

• redistricting
• distributive politics
• voter pivotality
• descriptive representation
• substantive representation