🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses RACH signaling storm attacks during the 5G initial access phase by validating this threat on a real-world OpenAirInterface testbed. We propose a novel, lightweight semi-open connection monitoring mechanism at the gNB to mitigate such attacks, complemented by a real-time visualization interface to enhance situational awareness. Experimental results in a live environment confirm the defense's effectiveness. Furthermore, we have open-sourced the complete implementation and test platform, providing a reproducible benchmark for attack evaluation. This work establishes a solid experimental foundation for future 5G security strategy research, effectively bridging the gap between theoretical models and practical empirical validation.
📝 Abstract
The initial access phase of the 5G system remains sensitive because the base station (gNB) must allocate radio resources before the user is fully authenticated. In particular, the random access channel (RACH) procedure can be abused to generate large numbers of incomplete connection attempts, creating a signaling storm that consumes gNB resources and prevents legitimate users from connecting successfully. In this paper, we implement this signaling storm attack using the OpenAirInterface project and validate it on a real testbed composed of software-defined radios and commercial phones. We then design and implement a lightweight mitigation technique that operates directly at the gNB by monitoring and acting on suspicious half-open connections. To make the system observable in practice, we also develop a network management interface that visualizes the network state in real time and highlights suspicious activity during the attack phase. Finally, the work is released as open source so that other researchers can reproduce our results, build on the implementation, and evaluate new mitigation strategies.