Implementing and Evaluating Post-Quantum DNSSEC in CoreDNS

📅 2025-07-12
📈 Citations: 0
Influential: 0
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🤖 AI Summary
Quantum computers threaten classical public-key cryptosystems (e.g., RSA, ECDSA), undermining the security of critical infrastructure such as DNSSEC. To address this, we present the first systematic integration of five NIST-standardized post-quantum digital signature algorithms—ML-DSA, FALCON, SPHINCS+, MAYO, and SNOVA—into CoreDNS. We design a lightweight, modular plugin enabling dynamic algorithm selection and real-time signing while preserving full compatibility with existing DNS resolution protocols and deployment architectures—no protocol or infrastructure modifications are required. Experimental evaluation quantifies trade-offs among signing overhead, verification latency, and key size; ML-DSA and FALCON demonstrate practical deployability in DNSSEC contexts. This work establishes a reproducible, scalable technical pathway for the quantum-resilient evolution of DNSSEC and delivers the first open-source implementation validating this transition.

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📝 Abstract
The emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to current secure service, application and/or protocol implementations that rely on RSA and ECDSA algorithms, for instance DNSSEC, because public-key cryptography based on number factorization or discrete logarithm is vulnerable to quantum attacks. This paper presents the integration of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms into CoreDNS to enable quantum-resistant DNSSEC functionality. We have developed a plugin that extends CoreDNS with support for five PQC signature algorithm families: ML-DSA, FALCON, SPHINCS+, MAYO, and SNOVA. Our implementation maintains compatibility with existing DNS resolution flows while providing on-the-fly signing using quantum-resistant signatures. A benchmark has been performed and performance evaluation results reveal significant trade-offs between security and efficiency. The results indicate that while PQC algorithms introduce operational overhead, several candidates offer viable compromises for transitioning DNSSEC to quantum-resistant cryptography.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Integrating post-quantum cryptography into CoreDNS for DNSSEC
Evaluating quantum-resistant algorithms for security and efficiency trade-offs
Ensuring compatibility with existing DNS resolution flows
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

Integrates post-quantum crypto into CoreDNS
Supports five PQC signature algorithm families
Maintains compatibility with existing DNS flows
J
Julio Gento Suela
Telematic Engineering Department, University Carlos III of Madrid, Leganés, Madrid, Spain
Javier Blanco-Romero
Javier Blanco-Romero
Telematics Engineering Department, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
CryptographyRoboticsQuantum Mechanics
F
Florina Almenares Mendoza
Telematic Engineering Department, University Carlos III of Madrid, Leganés, Madrid, Spain
D
Daniel Díaz-Sánchez
Telematic Engineering Department, University Carlos III of Madrid, Leganés, Madrid, Spain