ISAC-Assisted Channel Knowledge Map Generation for Physical Layer Authentication

2026-07-22

AI Summary

This work addresses the challenge of transmitter location spoofing attacks in wireless communications by proposing a physical-layer authentication method leveraging Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC). The approach reconstructs the environmental layout via ISAC and employs ray tracing to construct a Channel Knowledge Map (CKM), which enables comparison between the channel estimated from the received signal and the expected channel from a legitimate transmitter, thereby verifying positional authenticity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to utilize ISAC-derived environmental information for CKM construction, integrating sensing, communication, and security verification into a cross-layer, location-aided authentication framework. Accounting for ISAC reconstruction errors and channel estimation noise, the proposed scheme significantly reduces both false alarm and missed detection rates, with its feasibility and robustness validated on a public ISAC dataset.

Abstract

Integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) enables the acquisition of environmental information by leveraging wireless signals transmitted for communication purposes. In this paper, we utilize this capability to reconstruct the layout of objects surrounding multiple receivers. Ray tracing is then applied to the reconstructed environment to infer the propagation channels for various transmitter positions, thereby constructing a channel knowledge map (CKM). The CKM is then used to verify the position of a legitimate transmitter, authenticating it against an adversarial device attempting to impersonate it from a different location. This physical layer authentication (PLA) mechanism utilizes the approximate known position of the legitimate transmitter, obtained, for instance, from the network as in cross-layer authentication, to compare the channel estimated from the received signal with the corresponding CKM data. We evaluate the impact on the PLA performance of both ISAC-induced CKM reconstruction errors and receiver-side channel estimation noise, in terms of false alarm and missed detection probabilities. Finally, the proposed approach is validated using an ISAC dataset from the literature.

Problem

• ISAC
• Channel Knowledge Map
• Physical Layer Authentication
• Position Verification
• Impersonation Attack

Innovation

• Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC)
• Channel Knowledge Map (CKM)
• Physical Layer Authentication (PLA)
• Ray Tracing
• Position Verification