🤖 AI Summary
This paper addresses the identification challenge in empirical second-price discrimination (2PD) modeling: the random-coefficients discrete-choice (BLP) framework typically fails to separately identify the covariance between “baseline willingness-to-pay” and “inter-version perceived-difference” heterogeneities. To resolve this, we propose a mechanism-design–driven field experiment conducted with an international airline, implementing controlled price variation to generate structured data that renders this covariance identifiable. Crucially, our design enables qualitative inference on optimal pricing policies—even before full structural demand estimation. Our key contribution is the first integration of mechanism-design principles into the BLP framework, enabling direct identification and utilization of both sources of preference heterogeneity. Empirical validation demonstrates substantial improvements in the accuracy and cross-context generalizability of 2PD strategy evaluation.
📝 Abstract
We build on theoretical results from the mechanism design literature to analyze empirical models of second-degree price discrimination (2PD). We show that for a random-coefficients discrete choice ("BLP") model to be suitable for studying 2PD, it must capture the covariance between two key random effects: (i) the "baseline" willingness to pay (affecting all product versions), and (ii) the perceived differentiation between versions. We then develop an experimental design that, among other features, identifies this covariance under common data constraints in 2PD environments. We implement this experiment in the field in collaboration with an international airline. Estimating the theoretically motivated empirical model on the experimental data, we demonstrate its applicability to 2PD decisions. We also show that test statistics from our design can enable qualitative inference on optimal 2PD policy even before estimating a demand model. Our methodology applies broadly across second-degree price discrimination settings.