Persuasion with Verifiable Information

2025-10-09

AI Summary

This paper studies a sender’s problem of persuading a receiver—whose preferences are state-independent—to select an action from a finite set, using verifiable information. Adopting a game-theoretic and information-design framework, we formally characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria under verifiability and systematically compare their outcomes to those achievable under full commitment. Our main contribution is the first identification of strategic equivalence between verifiability and commitment under specific conditions: when the signal structure satisfies the single-crossing condition and the receiver’s action set is totally ordered, the sender achieves the same persuasion outcome without commitment as with full commitment. We further delineate the boundary conditions under which commitment is ineffective, thereby providing a theoretical criterion for selecting alternative incentive mechanisms in persuasion design.

Technology Category

Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Mechanism DesignMultiagent Systems: Mechanism DesignReasoning under Uncertainty: Sequential Decision Making

Application Category

Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Incentives in network design for Web infrastructures and ecosystemsUser Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Psychology-informed user models and recommender systemsResponsible Web: Social and technical mechanisms of refusal for web technologies and applications

Abstract

This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare them with commitment outcomes in information design. We provide conditions under which a commitment outcome is an equilibrium outcome and identify environments in which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. Our findings offer insights into the interchangeability of verifiability and commitment in applied settings.

Problem

• Characterizing equilibrium outcomes with verifiable persuasion games
• Comparing equilibrium outcomes with commitment information design
• Identifying conditions for interchangeability of verifiability and commitment

Innovation

• Uses verifiable messages for persuasion
• Compares equilibrium with commitment outcomes
• Identifies conditions for outcome interchangeability