🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the challenge of large-scale unsolicited Internet traffic targeting Internet of Things (IoT) devices and its associated security threats by proposing a lightweight monitoring approach that operates without payload inspection. Leveraging data collected via network telescopes, the method integrates privacy-preserving metadata analysis, behavioral heuristics, and Shannon entropy measurements to effectively identify coordinated scanning and backscatter activities. The findings reveal that the top 1% of source IP addresses generate over 81% of the observed traffic, with Telnet ports (23/2323) dominating the activity—evidence of highly concentrated, synchronized, and multi-vector reconnaissance campaigns. This work provides a scalable and practical analytical framework for enhancing large-scale IoT threat situational awareness.
📝 Abstract
Network telescopes serve as a critical passive monitoring tool for capturing unsolicited Internet traffic, providing insights into global scanning and reconnaissance behavior. This study analyzes a 10-day dataset during January 2025 consisting of approximately 22 million packets collected by the ORION network telescope at Merit Network. By employing privacy-preserving metadata analysis and lightweight behavioral heuristics, we identify scanning and backscatter patterns without payload inspection. Our results reveal a highly structured and centralized ecosystem, where the top 1% of source IP addresses generate over 81% of total traffic. A significant finding is the dominance of Port 23 (Telnet) and Port 2323 (Telnet Alt), which highlights the persistent nature of IoT security threats and widespread attempts to exploit weak credentials in legacy IoT devices. Furthermore, synchronized surges in packet volume and Shannon entropy indicate coordinated, multi-vector reconnaissance campaigns. These findings offer a practical framework for identifying large-scale threat activity and support cybersecurity research and education.