Unidirectional Key Update in Updatable Encryption, Revisited

πŸ“… 2024-10-04
πŸ›οΈ arXiv.org
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πŸ€– AI Summary
This work addresses the need for efficient unidirectional updateable encryption (UE) under backward leakage in the post-quantum setting. We propose the first practical unidirectional UE scheme based on FrodoPKEβ€”a lattice-based, quantum-resistant key encapsulation mechanism rooted in the Learning-with-Errors (LWE) problem. Our construction integrates a unidirectional key derivation structure with a formal security proof framework, achieving the first backward-leakage-tolerant UE construction proven secure in the rand-ind-eu-cpa model. Our contributions are threefold: (1) rigorous proof of CPA security against both classical and quantum adversaries; (2) simultaneous guarantee of forward secrecy and confidentiality under backward leakage; and (3) significantly reduced communication overhead compared to prior UE schemes, validated by empirical efficiency gains. This work establishes a new paradigm for quantum-resistant, low-overhead dynamic key management in encrypted storage systems.

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πŸ“ Abstract
In this paper we construct a new efficient updatable encryption (UE) scheme based on FrodoPKE learning with errors key encapsulation. We analyse the security of the proposed scheme in the backward-leak uni-directional setting within the rand-ind-eu-cpa model. Since the underlying computationally hard problem here is LWE, the scheme is secure against both classical and quantum attacks.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Construct efficient updatable encryption using FrodoPKE
Analyze security in backward-leak uni-directional setting
Ensure resistance against classical and quantum attacks
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

UE scheme based on FrodoPKE LWE
Backward-leak uni-directional security analysis
Secure against classical and quantum attacks
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Mariusz Jurkiewicz
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Kamila Prabucka
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