On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium

2026-04-10

AI Summary

This study investigates the relationship between Greenberg’s (1989) criterion of nondiscriminatory conservative stability and the set of perfect coalition equilibrium paths in repeated coalition games. By employing game-theoretic modeling and set-inclusion analysis, the paper rigorously demonstrates that the set of perfect coalition equilibrium paths coincides precisely with the largest set satisfying the nondiscriminatory conservative stability criterion, thereby establishing its theoretical extremal status among such behavioral standards. This result not only reveals an equivalence between the two concepts but also, for the first time, explicitly characterizes the maximality and normative significance of the perfect coalition equilibrium path set, offering a novel theoretical foundation for the analysis of coalition stability.

Technology Category

Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Cooperative Game TheoryMultiagent Systems: Mechanism DesignReasoning under Uncertainty: Decision/Utility Theory

Application Category

Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Incentives in network design for Web infrastructures and ecosystemsSecurity and Privacy: Large-scale security measurementsResponsible Web: Social and technical mechanisms of refusal for web technologies and applications

Abstract

We show that in Greenberg (1989)'s coalitional repeated game situation, every nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium (Ali and Liu 2026) paths. Moreover, the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths itself is a nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior. The set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths is therefore the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.

Problem

• Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior
• Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
• Coalitional Repeated Game
• Nondiscriminating
• Equilibrium Paths

Innovation

• Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior
• Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
• Coalitional Repeated Game
• Nondiscriminating Behavior
• Equilibrium Paths