Cost Sharing with Hidden Time Flexibility

๐Ÿ“… 2026-09-23
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๐Ÿ“ Abstract
Customers often specify acceptable time intervals for receiving a service. When service on a date entails a fixed activation cost, overlapping intervals allow joint service and cost sharing. Customers may nevertheless conceal flexibility by reporting a smaller interval, affecting both operating cost and its allocation. We ask whether an operator can select a core allocation at every reported profile without making concealment profitable. We establish sharp population boundaries for preventing such coalitional reductions. When intervals may be narrowed from either end, a core-selecting rule preventing such reductions exists if and only if there are at most three customers. With four or more customers, impossibility holds even under Pareto contraction-proofness, which excludes deviations making every contracting customer weakly better off and at least one strictly better off. The impossibility persists when each contracting customer conceals only an arbitrarily small fraction of her feasible interval. The boundaries change when either the earliest or latest acceptable date of every customer is verifiable. With common verified dates, equal sharing is core-selecting and prevents such reductions for any population size. When verified dates may differ, the boundary rises to five: such a rule exists for up to five customers, whereas with six or more no core-selecting rule prevents the contracting customers from reducing their combined payment. Under Pareto contraction-proofness, however, core selection is possible for every population size on either one-sided domain. Finally, the relaxations needed for approximate core selection and coalitional contraction-proofness must grow with population size.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Cost Sharing
Time Flexibility
Core Allocation
Concealment
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

core selection
time flexibility
cost sharing
Pareto contraction-proofness
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