Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
disaster risk
capability frontier
safety threshold
Cooperating against Catastrophe
🤖 AI Summary
研究通过构建连续时间博弈模型，分析两家企业如何在能力提升与安全阈值之间平衡以避免共同灾难，揭示了不同条件下企业的竞速与同步策略选择。
📝 Abstract
We study a continuous-time game in which two firms choose how quickly to advance their capabilities while an exogenous safety threshold advances at a fixed rate. When the capability frontier (max of firms' capabilities) exceeds the safety threshold, all firms are exposed to common disaster that arrives at a hazard rate increasing in the capability-safety difference. We characterize Markov perfect equilibria in terms of the disaster risk, how quickly safety advances, and flow payoffs: when they are low, only racing is an equilibrium; when they are intermediate, racing and pacing coexist; when they are high, only pacing survives. Across all subgame perfect equilibria, low risk induces perpetual racing while high risk rules it out and we bound the probability of disaster across all SPE. If internal capabilities are hidden with a fixed lag until deployment, it is harder to sustain pacing which highlights the importance of transparency about internal capabilities.
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
continuous-time game
safety threshold
disaster risk
Markov perfect equilibria
transparency
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