🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the challenge of balancing privacy preservation and recognition utility in video-based action recognition by systematically reviewing 32 relevant works and organizing them into a five-category technical framework encompassing adversarial learning, skeleton-based modeling, cryptographic approaches, differential privacy, and hybrid methods. The work innovatively introduces a PRISMA-guided systematic review methodology, a formal threat model, a unified evaluation protocol termed PPAR, and a deployment-oriented standardization roadmap. It further proposes a two-dimensional privacy space taxonomy to clarify the trade-offs among privacy, utility, and efficiency. Findings reveal that only 10% of existing studies adopt formal privacy definitions; skeleton-based methods achieve up to 85% accuracy yet discard appearance information, while adversarial approaches maintain nearly 80% recognition utility under moderate privacy guarantees.
📝 Abstract
Video surveillance in public safety, healthcare, and smart environments has made continuous human monitoring routine, raising real risks to personal identity and appearance. Privacy-preserving action recognition (PPAR) tackles the tension between the utility of video understanding and this exposure, and has drawn fast-growing interest. However, existing surveys remain narrow. Most catalog a single mechanism family, predate recent adversarial and hybrid work, or barely address evaluation. The result is a fragmented literature with incompatible threat models, inconsistent metrics, and no shared evaluation standard. We address this with a PRISMA-guided review of 32 peer-reviewed papers (2018--2026) drawn from 885 screened records. Methods sort into five families, namely adversarial learning (52%), skeleton-based (20%), cryptographic (12%), differential privacy (8%), and hybrid (8%), each with distinct privacy, utility, and efficiency trade-offs. Evaluation is the weak point. Only 10% of papers adopt a formal privacy definition, 65% rely on ad-hoc metrics, and 40% report an inconsistently defined cMAP. The trade-offs are steep. Skeleton methods reach about 85% accuracy but drop appearance, adversarial methods hold near 80% utility at moderate privacy (cMAP 0.9 to 0.3--0.5), and differential privacy often falls below 70%. Harder conditions stay under-tested, with fewer than 15% of papers checking cross-dataset generalization, under 10% testing adaptive attackers, and real-time edge deployment nearly untouched. We contribute a two-dimensional privacy-space taxonomy, a formal threat model, a comparative trade-off analysis, the PPAR Unified Evaluation Protocol, and a roadmap centered on benchmark standardization. With this grounding, we argue PPAR can move from prototypes toward deployment, with lessons extending to face recognition and medical imaging.