🤖 AI Summary
In post-AGI economies, the Second Welfare Theorem of traditional welfare economics fails due to non-commodifiable factors such as autonomy, identity continuity, and preference entanglement. This work proposes an “Autonomy-Constrained Second Welfare Theorem” that incorporates autonomy-preserving constraints—including convexity, moral status stability, and non-substitutable rights—to distinguish between economic preferences and entangled neurocognitive traits. It further integrates AGI-specific attributes, such as self-modification capacity and moral state stability, into the analytical framework. Drawing on mathematical economics, mechanism design, and formal verification, the study develops a decentralized resource allocation theory tailored to post-AGI societies. The framework establishes sufficient conditions for achieving Pareto-optimal allocations that are efficient, formally verifiable, and respectful of individual autonomy, thereby laying a theoretical foundation for human-AI co-governed economic systems.
📝 Abstract
The classical Second Welfare Theorem decentralizes any Pareto efficient allocation through prices and transfers under convexity and regularity. In post AGI economies, autonomy rights, self-modification, identity continuity, and superposed preferences need not behave as commodities or define a stable welfare relation, so this reduction may fail even when a supporting hyperplane exists. We give an autonomy-qualified Second Welfare Theorem stating the joint conditions convexity, stable moral status, non-fungible rights, welfare selection, non manipulation, governed self modification, and verification under which an autonomy Pareto optimum remains certifiably decentralizable, distinguishing economic preference superposition, a hypothesis about context-indexed choice, from neural feature superposition.