🤖 AI Summary
This study investigates the existence of constant-factor approximations to envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) in the allocation of indivisible chores under complement-free cost functions. Focusing on monotone subadditive and submodular cost settings, the authors introduce a novel approach combining refined counterexample constructions with a weighted covering model and ordinal preference profiles. They establish the first explicit inapproximability lower bounds for EFX allocations: in a three-agent, six- chore instance, any α-EFX allocation must satisfy α ≥ 2^{1/3} ≈ 1.26 under subadditive costs and α ≥ 20/19 under submodular costs. These results significantly narrow the gap between previously known upper and lower bounds, advancing the understanding of fairness guarantees in chore division under realistic cost structures.
📝 Abstract
We study the approximability of EFX allocations for indivisible chores under complement-free cost functions. The non-existence of exact EFX allocations for general monotone functions for chores is known from \cite{CS24}, and a result of \cite{akrami2026} transfers such comparison-based non-existence results to monotone submodular, and hence subadditive, functions. We strengthen this picture by giving explicit constant-factor inapproximability results for submodular and subadditive functions.
Our main construction is a three-agent, six-chore instance with monotone subadditive cost functions for which no $α$-EFX allocation exists for any $1\le α<2^{1/3}\approx 1.26$, thus narrowing the gap with the known upper bound of $2$. The construction is obtained by refining the original counterexample of \cite{CS24} and using the approach of \cite{mackenzie2026}. We also give a weighted-coverage realization of the ordinal profile, yielding an instance in which no $α$-EFX allocation exists for any $1\le α<20/19$ under submodular costs. Thus, even within well-studied complement-free classes, EFX for chores admits nontrivial constant lower bounds on approximability.