🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the vulnerability of proprietary classifiers to model stealing via knowledge distillation from their soft outputs. To counter this threat, the authors propose an anti-distillation sampling method that injects input-dependent, gradient-guided perturbations into the teacher model’s output distribution. Crucially, this approach preserves the teacher’s Top-1 accuracy exactly—incurred zero utility loss—while significantly degrading the distillability of its predictions. The core innovation lies in integrating a closed-form confidence-bound budgeted perturbation, temperature scaling analysis, and gradient-oriented distributional perturbation, thereby achieving the first utility-preserving defense against distillation-based theft. Experimental results demonstrate substantial drops in student model accuracy—by 17.4, 29.6, and 13.3 percentage points on CIFAR-100, CIFAR-10, and Tiny-ImageNet, respectively—without any degradation in the teacher model’s performance.
📝 Abstract
Knowledge distillation enables an adversary to replicate a proprietary classifier by querying its prediction interface and training a surrogate on the returned probability vectors. Antidistillation sampling, proposed for large language models, counters this threat with an input-dependent, gradient-directed perturbation of the served distribution; its transfer to classification has not been studied. Adapting the defense to classification, we show its behavior is governed by the distribution of the teacher's per-input confidence margins. Because well-trained classifiers are severely overconfident, the direct transfer exhibits an inert window: below a closed-form-predictable threshold, it affects neither attacker nor defender; beyond it, the defense undergoes a phase transition and degrades the teacher faster than the attacker's student. Temperature softening rescales the transition in closed form, and every temperature configuration lies on the same unfavorable trade-off curve. Our method, ADS-C, composes the perturbation under a closed-form, per-input margin budget that provably preserves every served top-1 prediction, so the defended teacher's accuracy equals the undefended teacher's identically. Under this guarantee the distilled student still loses 17.4 percentage points on CIFAR-100, 29.6 on CIFAR-10, and 13.3 on Tiny-ImageNet; matching this degradation with the unmodified defense costs 27.5, 32.9, and 22.2 points of teacher accuracy. Because served labels are unchanged, a hard-label attacker gains nothing, while the defended soft output trains a student up to 29.7 points below that floor: the incentive to distill served probabilities is not merely removed but reversed. To our knowledge, ADS-C is the first antidistillation defense for classification whose utility cost is exactly zero.