Quantifying Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics Systems via an Impedance-Based Attack Reachable Domain

2026-05-14

AI Summary

This study addresses the lack of quantitative methods for assessing an attacker’s ability to destabilize power electronic systems under constrained access. The authors propose an impedance-based Attack Reachability Domain (ARD) framework, introducing the ARD concept to map adversarial actions—via impedance reshaping—to critical eigenvalue shifts. They define an Attack Penetration Index that jointly characterizes the extent of stability margin erosion and the reachability of destabilizing attacks. By integrating impedance modeling, eigenvalue analysis, and a differentiable surrogate model, the framework enables gray-box vulnerability assessment even when system models are partially unknown. Validation on a 4-node system and a modified IEEE 39-bus system demonstrates that cross-layer coordinated attacks are significantly more disruptive than single-layer attacks, and the proposed index reveals node-level vulnerability patterns undetectable by conventional grid strength metrics.

Abstract

Power electronics systems are increasingly exposed to cyber threats due to their integration with digital controllers and communication networks. However, an attacker-oriented metric is still lacking to quantify the extent to which a node can be pushed toward instability within a privilege-constrained action space. This letter proposes an impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain (ARD) framework that maps feasible adversarial actions to critical-eigenvalue migration through impedance reshaping. Based on the ARD, an Attack Penetration Index is defined to quantify node-level cyber-vulnerability by jointly characterizing the penetration of the nominal stability margin and the accessibility of successful destabilizing attacks within a privilege-constrained action space. To make the proposed assessment computable when inverter models are unavailable, a practical gray-box workflow is further established by integrating existing impedance identification and differentiable surrogate tools. Case studies on a 4-bus system and a modified IEEE 39-bus system show that coordinated cross-layer manipulations are markedly more damaging than isolated single-layer attacks, and that the proposed metric reveals vulnerability patterns that cannot be inferred from grid-strength indicators.

Problem

• cyber-vulnerability
• power electronics systems
• attack reachable domain
• impedance-based analysis
• stability margin

Innovation

• Attack Reachable Domain
• Impedance-based vulnerability
• Attack Penetration Index
• Gray-box assessment
• Power electronics cyber-security