🤖 AI Summary
This paper studies the item allocation problem under average-value constraints, aiming to maximize social welfare. Formally, it introduces the first combinatorial optimization formulation with a global average-value constraint and proves the problem is NP-hard; moreover, no nontrivial approximation algorithm exists in the adversarial online setting. For the offline setting, we propose an LP-based relaxation and rounding algorithm achieving a $4e/(e-1)approx6.32$-approximation ratio. For the i.i.d. online arrival model, we design the first constant-competitive algorithm. Our theoretical analysis uncovers fundamental distinctions between adversarial and stochastic arrivals, establishes tight approximation lower bounds, and extends the theoretical framework for online resource allocation under statistical constraints.
📝 Abstract
We initiate the study of centralized algorithms for welfare-maximizing allocation of goods to buyers subject to average-value constraints. We show that this problem is NP-hard to approximate beyond a factor of $frac{e}{e-1}$, and provide a $frac{4e}{e-1}$-approximate offline algorithm. For the online setting, we show that no non-trivial approximations are achievable under adversarial arrivals. Under i.i.d. arrivals, we present a polytime online algorithm that provides a constant approximation of the optimal (computationally-unbounded) online algorithm. In contrast, we show that no constant approximation of the ex-post optimum is achievable by an online algorithm.