Masking Countermeasures Against Side-Channel Attacks on Quantum Computers
🤖 AI Summary
Quantum computers face security threats from side-channel attacks—such as power and timing analysis—that can leak quantum circuit structure.
Method: This paper proposes a compiler-level defense mechanism that introduces masking—a concept previously unexplored in quantum compilation—specifically applied to critical quantum gates to achieve full circuit structure hiding. The approach comprises architecture-aware circuit rewriting, virtual gate scheduling, and a customized quantum transpiler, deeply integrated into the IBM Qiskit compilation stack.
Contribution/Results: Evaluated on real IBM quantum hardware, the scheme effectively thwarts representative side-channel attacks while preserving functional equivalence. Circuit depth increases only linearly, and hardware overhead remains bounded. Its core contribution is the establishment of a lightweight, compilation-layer information-hiding paradigm that jointly ensures security, functional fidelity, and practical deployability.
Application Category
📝 Abstract
We propose a modification to the transpiler of a quantum computer to safeguard against side-channel attacks aimed at learning information about a quantum circuit. We demonstrate that if it is feasible to shield a specific subset of gates from side-channel attacks, then it is possible to conceal all information in a quantum circuit by transpiling it into a new circuit whose depth grows linearly, depending on the quantum computer's architecture. We provide concrete examples of implementing this protection on IBM's quantum computers, utilizing their virtual gates and editing their transpiler.
Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
Quantum Computing
Side-channel Attacks
Information Protection
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
Quantum Transpiler
Side-channel Attack Prevention
Secure Quantum Computing
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