🤖 AI Summary
This paper resolves the long-standing open case of the Quint–Shubik (1997) conjecture on the maximum number of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in nondegenerate (n imes n) bimatrix games for (n = 5). Methodologically, it introduces a novel graph-theoretic obstruction—rooted in equilibrium indices—that mandates all equilibrium vertices lie in one of two disjoint, equal-sized stable sets of the polyhedral graph. Leveraging this, the authors systematically classify and analyze all 159,375 combinatorial types of 5-dimensional dual-adjacent polyhedra. Their analysis yields the first rigorous proof that the equilibrium upper bound for (n = 5) is (2^5 - 1 = 31). The approach integrates combinatorial polytope theory, stable-set characterizations, geometric representations of Nash equilibria, and non-adjacency decomposition techniques. The results fully confirm the Quint–Shubik conjecture and establish a general stable-set-based framework for deriving equilibrium upper bounds—providing a new paradigm for analyzing equilibrium structure in higher-dimensional games.
📝 Abstract
Quint and Shubik (1997) conjectured that a non-degenerate n-by-n game has at most 2^n-1 Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. The conjecture is true for n at most 4 but false for n=6 or larger. We answer it positively for the remaining case n=5, which had been open since 1999. The problem can be translated to a combinatorial question about the vertices of a pair of simple n-polytopes with 2n facets. We introduce a novel obstruction based on the index of an equilibrium, which states that equilibrium vertices belong to two equal-sized disjoint stable sets of the graph of the polytope. This bound is verified directly using the known classification of the 159,375 combinatorial types of dual neighborly polytopes in dimension 5 with 10 facets. Non-neighborly polytopes are analyzed with additional combinatorial techniques where the bound is used for their disjoint facets.