Choice via Ownership Rules

2026-10-05

AI Summary

This study addresses the challenges of ambiguous decision accountability and irreconcilable preference conflicts in collective choice. By integrating game theory, social choice theory, and axiomatic modeling, it constructs a collective choice model grounded in ownership rules. Specifically, this work proposes three characterization methods for ownership rules within nested environments, deeply intertwining the allocation of decision rights across diverse choice menus with individual preference maximization and accountability mechanisms. The contributions include a systematic characterization of multiple ownership rules and the explicit identification of decision agents alongside their corresponding accountability pathways under various scenarios. Ultimately, this research offers a novel theoretical analytical framework for understanding the alignment of authority and responsibility in collective decision-making processes.

Abstract

We consider a model of collective choice where for each menu there is an agent who is accountable for the choice made. Specifically, we assume that two agents (individuals or selves) allocate choice tasks over different menus using an ownership rule: the owner of the decision over a menu picks what maximizes his own preference and is accountable for it. We characterize three distinct ownership rules under different (nested) choice environments.

Problem

• collective choice
• ownership rules
• accountability
• choice tasks
• menu allocation

Innovation

• collective choice
• ownership rules
• accountability
• menu allocation
• preference maximization